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ABSTRACT 
The waves of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and any other country that may follow, is 
considered a unique phenomenon worth studying in view of the pre and post revolution events and effects on all sectors 
of the national economy, as well as their interlocking effects on the global economy. The current research aims at 
studying the concepts of the Arab Spring, its causes and its most important consequences, as well as the ability of the 
current economic theory to interpret such events. The most important results of the research lies in the need for a new 
theory to explain the Arab Spring revolutions, the new theory should based on showing how important was the techno-
logical revolution in the field of communications, the use of violence against the rebels, and legitimate demands of re-
bels in continuation and success of the revolutions of the Arab Spring. 
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1. Introduction 
The revolution in Egypt—as one of the Arab Spring 
countries—began by a series of popular movements on 
Tuesday, January 25, 2011, to protest against the eco-
nomic, social and political conditions, those protests con-
tinued and gained momentum and eventually led to the 
resignation of President Mubarak from power on Febru-
ary 11, 2011, when the Vice President Mr. Omar 
Suleiman announced in a brief statement at 6 PM of Fri-
day, February 11, 2011, that president Mubarak decided 
to step down from office and that the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces will assume the country’s admini-
stration. The period from February 2011 to July 2012 
represented a period of historic transformation in the 
Egyptian economy. The relinquish of power by the for-
mer Egyptian President on February 11, 2011 ended 
thirty years of authoritarian rule and opened the doors to 
a new era of desired change, freedom and democracy. 
However, the revolution that led to the end of Mubarak’s 
era greatly influenced the development and growth in the 
Egyptian economy, where the growth rate in real GDP of 
5.1% in 2010 was decreased to 1.8% in 2011, it also led a 
negative growth estimated at 4.2% during the first quar-
ter of 2011. The sectors that support the economy in the 
provision of hard currency fell sharply in revenue. For-
eign cash inflow has decreased from 6.4 billion dollars in 
2010 to 482.7 million dollars in 2011, and for the tourism 
sector—responsible for hiring nearly 10% of the popula-
tion—has suffered a decline in foreign tourism by 30%, 
according to central bank data. Also the Suez Canal 
revenues and Egyptian exports also fell down due to de-
creased foreign demand [1]. The author sees that study-
ing the Arab Spring from all its dimensions can improve 
understanding of the key dynamics of political conflicts 
and it can also lead to a more systematic understanding 
of how these dynamics affect conflict resolution and 
post-conflict peace building. 
The research aims at studying the concepts associated 
with the Arab Spring, its economic reasons, as well as its 
consequences, and then demonstrate the possibility of 
interpreting the Arab Spring revolutions in the light of 
the current economic framework of the prevailing eco-
nomic literature, or that there should be a new theory that 
commensurate with the nature of these revolutions. We 
will adopt Egypt as the case study as the state in which 
the Arab Spring crystallized and proved fruitful. 
2. Analytical Framework 
Many studies dealt with economic causes of civil, re-
gional and international wars and conflicts and presented 
their economic effects at various levels, but the Arab 
Spring revolutions or popular revolutions that took place 
in a number of Arab states led by Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Yemen have special features, causes and conse-
quences that differ much from the nature of civil wars, 
regional wars and wars between nations as well as armed 
and unarmed conflicts. Although this adds difficulty to 
the research and study process, but at the same time, 
gives special importance to the current research for the 
unique facts included which sometimes agree and some-
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times disagree with many points and contents of eco-
nomic literature. 
2.1. Economic Concept of Political Unrest 
In nature, humans tend to live in peace which requires 
the provision of security. In other words, they need to 
feel secure for themselves, their families and their prop-
erty. The desire of the human being to work and be pro-
ductive declines in tense environment that lacks safety 
and security and also if he feels injustice and inequality 
[2], therefore, stable governments have increased interest 
in providing security and safety for their citizens at home 
and protect them from dangers when they are abroad. For 
that governments set aside part of their revenues to spend 
in this regard. There is no doubt that increasing tension in 
one country requires more spending, which requires in-
creased taxation to provide the necessary funding for this 
purpose [3,4]. Tension or political unrest lead to the 
conversion of part of the state’s resources allocated to 
produce civilian goods and services to produce materials 
and equipment used to face these disturbances, thus we 
can—economically—define revolutions as exploiting 
part of the state’s resources in non-civilian production, or 
the transfer of part of the resources exploited for civil 
production of goods and services to the people to be ex-
ploited in the production of weapons, equipment, plans 
and strategies to resolve or stop the spread of the unrest. 
All this will be reflected in the form of low living stan-
dard, increased rates of inflation, and that may be ac-
companied by an increase in unemployment rates also if 
the state imports the weapons and equipment used to 
suppress the demonstrations and try to prevent the out-
break of revolutions. As for the Arab Spring revolutions, 
they can be defined as popular movements swept across 
the country to demand comprehensive change and were 
helped by the irresponsible behaviors and actions of the 
regime to gain legitimacy and momentum which led to 
higher demands until the regime was toppled. 
2.2. Economic Explanation of the Political 
Unrest 
Literature studied the determinants of civilian conflict 
and reasons of its onset. The main two determinants are 
motivation and feasibility. Motivation or incentives, it 
can be explained by distinguished between two possible 
incentives: negative—a grievance against the existing 
state of affairs and positive—a desire to get rich, which 
sometimes called greed [5]. These incentives—together— 
called “justice-seeking” in literature. Game theory is 
used to study this factor and its implication. The rebels 
are put on one side and government is put on the other 
side. The second factor is feasibility where the rebel 
group is viewed as an unusual type of business which can 
only prosper in special conditions [6]. This factor is 
called “looting-seeking” in literature. The civilian con-
flict often occurs as a result of actors’ desire for private 
gain where the presence of a “lootable” resource base 
creates the incentive for looting-seeking rebellions. The 
main two factors affect on feasibility of rebellion are the 
number and opportunity costs of potential rebels and 
government’s military strength. The first factor affects 
positively and the second effects negatively on the reali-
zation of rebellion. Justice-seeking rebellions may be 
caused by grievance and may aim at achieving justice. 
The onset of “justice-seeking” rebellion conditions are 
determined by the interaction between demand for and 
supply of justice. Demand for justice are determined by 
three factors; first the presence of a large number of un-
employed and uneducated young man or social fraction-
alization. Second, political repression and third, eco-
nomic dysfunction i.e. slow economic growth; high in-
flation; high income inequality and all other inequality 
aspects like inequality in education, health and power 
[7,8]. On the other side, supply of justice is determined 
by the cost of achieving justice. The achieving of justice 
cost is determined, in turn, by the opportunity cost of 
rebel labor and its constrained by the collective action 
problems associated with providing justice [9,10]. Iden-
tity can be added as a third determinant of civil conflict 
which is essential for group formation. Rebels will not 
act together unless they see themselves as being in the 
same boat [5]. In modeling the mentioned three factors, 
[11] labels them frustration, opportunity, and identity 
where [12,13] used concepts of greed and grievance. [14] 
stated that going to war require opportunity and willing-
ness discarding identity from their model. Opportunity is 
possibilities that are alternatives where willingness is 
choosing of option(s) from possible alternative. No doubt 
that the costs and benefits are differ from one conflict to 
another according to its reasons, duration, results, and 
many other factors. The three factors affect the length of 
conflict where rebels need motivation to keep on fighting, 
and they need resource(s) to finance their fighting. Dura-
tion of the conflict is an important issue to study and ex-
pect. If rebels have perfect foresight, so the expected 
duration of the conflict coincides with the actual duration. 
But if they have rational expectation but not perfect fore-
sight, then the observed duration of the conflict is a bi-
ased prediction of the expected duration [15]. 
The economic theory of political unrest argues that the 
motivation of unrest is not important. Instead, the capa-
bility to finance the unrest is the important factor for de-
termining whether or not the country will experience 
political unrest [16]. The economic theory of political 
unrest assumes that perceived grievances and the lust for 
power are nearly equal in societies. The important issue 
is the feasibility of predation which determines the risk 
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of conflict. Collier states that “it is not really matter 
whether rebels are motivated by greed, by a lust for 
power, or by grievance, as long as what causes conflict 
is the feasibility of predation”. 
2.3. Economic Factors of the Political Unrest 
Risk 
Studies on the causes of various types of political unrest 
decide that certain conditions increase the likelihood of 
occurrence of these disturbances, those conditions are: 
First, the existence of a close relationship between pov-
erty and political unrest [17-19] studies showed that a 
country with GDP per capita of $250 annually is prone to 
political unrest by 15%, this drops to half with higher 
GDP per capita of $600 annually, also goes down again 
to about 4% with higher GDP per capita of $1250 annu-
ally, and goes to less than 1% in countries with an aver-
age income per individual higher than $5000 per year. 
Second, the level of education is related to the possibility 
of political strikes through the opportunity cost to join 
the rebel group, an uneducated person would not lose 
much by joining rebel groups regardless of the accom-
panying risk or, the opportunity cost to join these groups 
is low or non-existent [16], especially with the correla-
tion between the level of education and the chance of 
getting employment in poor countries [18]. Countries 
where 54% of young males are in secondary education 
may be subjected to political unrest, however, when this 
percentage is increased to 55%, the chance of being sub-
jected to political unrest drops from 14% to 10%. Third, 
political unrest appears more in countries with high 
population growth rate. Each increase of 1% in the rate 
of population growth increases the risk of political unrest 
by 2.5%. Fourth, also the risk of political unrest increases 
in countries with low level of income, every 1% decrease 
in the rate of growth of per capita income increases the 
risk of political unrest by 1% as well. Fifth, the ethnic 
and religious component of the population is also a factor 
that determinants political unrest, the existence of a 
dominant constituent of 45% - 90% of the population 
would be enough to double the risk of political unrest. 
Finally, technology can have an important role in the 
beginnings of revolutions, it also affect which path would 
such revolutions take and consequently, the extent of 
their success, through using the so called “The Contest 
Success Function (CSF)”, which determines the re-
sources devoted to conflict outcomes in the forms of 
losses and gains of the two sides of the conflict [20,21]. 
2.4. Tracks of Political Unrest 
In general, the starting spark of popular moves is the de- 
grading conditions in the country. As a result of the poor 
economic and social conditions in the national economy,  
individuals feel dissatisfied with the level and quality of 
life, from here the idea of change occurs, changing their 
reality to what they feel better from their point of view. 
This requires starting to do something, this action may be 
legal or permitted, or illegal and unauthorized, and the 
first type may indicate demonstrations or formation of a 
lobby, while the second type may indicate to carry out 
bombing or hijacking acts. The reason for resorting to the 
second type is often because peaceful demonstrations are 
not allowed, or allowed initially then planned or un-
planned things might happen from one or both parties, 
and the protestors may be dealt with violently, which 
could turn the demonstrations into a more complex as-
pect and raises the demands roof of the demonstrators 
themselves. If the demonstrations turned into wide 
bombing or hijacking acts, that lead to the depletion of 
the country’s resources and the prevalence of insecurity 
and instability and that often do not bring the desired 
change, and the losses outweigh the gains—if any—and 
with the continuation of violence, the demonstration 
could turn into a revolution (see Figure 1). 
2.5. Interpretation of the Length of the Political 
Unrest 
Political unrest duration vary from one case to another 
for many reasons, these may not be confined to specific 
reasons, but we would rather decide that the length of the 
period of political unrest depends on the following im-
portant factors. 
2.5.1. Benefit of Some from Instability and Security 
Chaos Associated with Political Unrest 
Although political unrest adversely affect the national 
economy in general, but there are certain categories that 
make gains from these disturbances, so they do not tend 
to preserve peace and national security, but rather seek to 
work on insecurity and chaos, encouraging lawlessness 
and tampering with internal security and stability to 
achieve further gains [16,19]. 
2.5.2. Stability and Peace Is a Public Good That Has 
the Characteristics of Public Goods 
Public goods are characterized by non-exclude and 
non-rival in use. The non-exclude property indicates the 
inability to prevent some of benefit from the goods when 
they are available. Once a good is available, everyone 
will be able to benefit equally from that good, the avail-
ability of internal security and stability means that all 
citizens, even those who do not contribute to them nor 
want to provide them, should enjoy them. The non-rival 
in use property indicates that availability of a certain 
good should not be affected if being used by others, the 
se of a good by some does not reduce the chance of  u 
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Figure 1. Political unrest paths. Source: designed by the author. 
 
2.5.4. Lack of or Delayed Response to the Demands of 
the Demonstrators 
others to use the same good nor it does reduce their share 
of that good, thus, the use of security by some does not 
reduce the quality or quantity of security available for 
others. These two properties may result in less desire of 
some individuals to participate in providing security and 
stability, and would rather wait until they are available 
by efforts and contributions of others then use and bene-
fit from them which is refereed to—economically—as 
the free riding problem. As a result, the desire of indi-
viduals and citizens to bear the burden of providing secu-
rity and stability is much reduced and then, authorities 
must intervene and bear all the burden of providing secu-
rity and stability prolonging the period of political unrest. 
The lack of or delayed response of authorities to the de-
mands of the demonstrators may cause political unrest to 
turn from one form to another. In Egypt for example, the 
late response by the regime to demonstrators’ demands 
led to the increase in their demands each time, until they 
reached their peak by demanding the over-throw of the 
regime, a demand the rebels did not give it up after that. 
2.6. Impact of Political Unrest on the National 
Economy 
First of all, we recognize that the results of political un-
rest vary from one case to another depending on many 
factors, including the evolution extent of these distur-
bances, spread of such disturbances to cover more areas, 
how they were dealt with by the authorities and the dura-
tion and place of these disturbances. Results increase 
whenever political unrest occurs in large and densely 
populated cities, and the biggest impact of the demon-
strations would be in the country’s capital rather than in a 
small town. 
2.5.3. The Marginal Cost of Achieving Security and 
Stability Exceed Their Marginal Utility 
Comparing the private marginal benefit and the private 
marginal cost to provide internal security and stability, 
we find that the costs exceed the benefits due to the 
non-inclusion of social benefit for security and stability. 
In the economic logic of security providers, this good is 
not economically feasible, and then the decision-makers 
may feel reluctant to provide this good due to its high 
cost and the lack of understanding of its total benefit. 
Because of this, the internal security and stability is de-
layed due to the economic short sight of decision-makers. 
Political unrest leads to decline in GDP, which nega-
tively affects government revenues, and then affects 
government spending in general and spending on educa-
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tion and health in particular, in addition to the conse-
quent negative effects on the national economy [22]1. 
There are also indirect negative results, including the 
implications of the closure of shops, banks and disrupted 
public transport in many of the demonstrations sites. The 
direct negative effects of the demonstrations that turn 
into popular revolutions, particularly when violence is 
used by the regime, is symbolized by the loss of life of 
some protestors. There are some who are interested in 
estimating the value of life, including W. Kip Viscusi, 
who estimated the value of an American citizen’s life by 
about US $7.5 million in 2000, and of course, this value 
vary from one country to another and within the same 
country from time to time, but the fact that does not 
change is that the loss of life represents the biggest loss 
of demonstrations and revolutions, also the spread of 
chaos and lack of economic and political stability exerts 
a negative impact on the volume of executed investments 
and leads to a decline of future investment plans. Dem-
onstrations may somehow prevent the flow of goods and 
services into the market, which means lower commodity 
supply on one hand and increasing the stock on the other 
and both lead to higher prices either due to lack of supply 
as in the first case or the increased costs of production 
due to increased storage costs, as in the second case. 
Government’s response to factional demonstrations, 
facing material losses and compensation for life casual-
ties would lead to increase in government spending, this 
together with the inability of the productive body to re-
spond with an increase in production, prices will rise and 
inflation spreads, which negatively affects the purchasing 
power. As well as the finance of government spending 
may be through pumping new money and increasing the 
money supply in the market which also boosts inflation-
ary pressures. The sense of insecurity during demonstra-
tions may drive citizens to buy more goods and services 
for storage, leading to higher prices. Demonstrations lead 
to widespread insecurity and then high element of risk, 
and thus higher values of insurance premiums borne by 
the seller who may convert the burden to the consumer 
by raising the price of the product, which means more 
inflationary pressures. To fund losses resulting from 
demonstrations, governments may have to raise taxes, cut 
government spending, issue new cash bills or resort to 
borrowing whether from home or abroad through the 
issuance of government bonds. Figure 2 shows govern-
ment dependence on issuing new bonds to fund demon-
strations losses and then bonds supply increases moving 
the supply curve of bonds from S1bonds to S2bonds and thus 
changing the balance point from A to B leading to lower  
 
Price of Bonds 
Quantity of Bonds Q1 bonds Q2 bonds
S2 bondsS1 bonds Interest Rate 
D1 bonds
D2 bonds 
Price rises Int erest falls 
B
CA
 
Figure 2. Ways of funding political unrest. Source: P. Poast, The economics of war, 2006.      
 
1Some decide that war affects the national economy through two effects, the “Psychological Effect” on individuals, as the fear of individuals from 
political unrest lowers their spending desire, thus consumption and investment decrease and then the domestic product and income, but soon this 
effect disappears and individuals are back to their spending nature. The second effect is called the “Real Effect”, where increased government spend-
ing on weaponry and various equipment leads to increased domestic product and income on the short-term, but leads to higher prices after that, the 
final impact of wars depends on several factors, including state of the economy before the war, war prevalence. And the diversion of resources from 
civilian to non-civilian production, and finally the duration of the war and its cost and financing methods. 
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bond prices from P1 to P2 and consequently, the decrease 
in bond prices rises interest rates from i1 to i2. The gov-
ernment may see that they cannot afford to pay the high 
interest of bonds, thus, they might resort to issue new 
cash bills, buy the bonds that they have already issued, 
thus increasing the demand on these bonds which in-
crease their prices and lower their interest and the new 
equilibrium is achieved at the point C. 
Interest rates are used as a tool in controlling inflation. 
However, they can also have an impact on consumer 
spending. Sometimes interest rates may have little impact; 
however, if they coincide with other factors, they can 
cause a much bigger than expected fall in consumer 
spending. Another issue is interest rates can have a de-
layed effect. e.g. the effect of interest rate increases last 
year may continue to affect consumer spending for up to 
18 months. 
Studies indicate that political unrest adversely affect 
the flow of products across countries as a result of inse-
curity on the one hand and as a result of delays in ob-
taining licenses and entry of products to importing coun-
tries on the other, for example, the trade between coun-
tries is reduced by 6% as a result of increased terrorist 
incidents in one country [23]. 
The deterioration of the total variables in the national 
economy is reflected negatively on the value of the local 
currency, which constitutes a burden on the national 
economy in many respects, the most important of them is 
the rising value of debt in foreign currencies and the high 
value of imports in foreign currencies, as well as the de-
cline in domestic exports estimated in national currency. 
Financial markets are affected by economic, political 
and financial stabilities prevailing in the national econ-
omy, also changes in the financial markets also exert 
influence on the national economy, their effect is mutual 
and they support each other. 
3. The Arab Spring Revolutions: Egyptian 
Revolution as a Model 
Following, we study the Egyptian revolution as a model 
for the Arab Spring revolutions, The selection of Egypt 
came because the aspects of political life were nearly 
complete, there is a Consultative (Shura) Council, a sta-
ble judiciary system and a stable government, there is 
also an elected assembly developing a new constitution 
in accordance with the demands of the people and revo-
lution, as well as the presence of a President for the Re-
public elected by the people in free elections are charac-
terized by a high degree of integrity and transparency. 
3.1. The Path of the Egyptian Revolution 
In protest over the poor living, political and economic 
conditions, as well as the political corruption that spread 
over the Egyptian economy, a number of Egyptian oppo-
sition groups and independent individuals, as well as 
groups of young people have decided using social net-
working sites to perform a number of popular move-
ments on Tuesday, January 25, 2011 which was chosen 
to coincide with police day2. 
The transformation of demonstration or protest move- 
ments into a popular revolution requires a variety of fac- 
tors, including: First the demands of rebels must be le- 
gitimate and popular, that is there should be general con- 
sensus over them. Second, it should have organizational 
power to organize the pressure, escalation and negotia- 
tion processes to achieve the best results for the rebels 
and their demands. There is a critical factor in fueling the 
demonstrators and speed the turning of demonstrations 
into public revolution which is the fall of casualties 
among demonstrations due to violence against them by 
the regime, whether by the police, security forces, riot 
police or whatever name they had. Due to these factors 
demonstrations in Egypt have succeeded to turn into a 
popular revolution that destroyed the corrupt regime on 
February 11, and continued to achieve it goals despite the 
delay. The demands of the rebels were (bread—free- 
dom—human dignity) which were popular demands 
supported by the Egyptian people of various sects and 
classes, as well as the positive leadership and organiza- 
tional role played by the Muslim Brotherhood movement 
and other Islamic groups which helped a lot the success 
of the revolution, in addition that other parties and revo- 
lutionary forces joined force with the Islamists. Perhaps 
the most important event that turned demonstrations in 
Egypt into a popular revolution was the intervention of 
security to end violence at the dawn of January 26, then 
the use of excessive force with demonstrators on Friday 
28 January, which was called the Friday of anger. In 
contrast, demonstrations in Bahrain failed in the transi- 
tion to be a popular revolution, because they were not 
based legitimate demands of but religious demands 
backed only by one faction of the community, and not 
backed by the whole Bahraini people, as well as the wise 
behavior of the government in Bahrain and also moderate 
reckless actions by Security and police forces in dealing 
with the demonstrators, in addition to the fast response of 
the authorities to engage in dialogue with the leaders of 
the demonstrators have a significant impact on the con- 
tainment of the demonstrations in the short term, and 
indeed, authorities had met a lot of the demonstrators’ 
demands, but some demands were not answered because 
they lack legitimacy and consensus thus turning peaceful 
2In manifestation of political corruption, elections for the parliament 
were conducted two months before the outbreak of the revolution and 
the ruling National Party won 97% of the seats meaning that the Coun-
cil had devoid of any form of opposition, which struck the frustrated,
citizens who described the elections as false especially that it does not 
reflect the reality on the Egyptian street. 
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demonstrations into limited acts of sabotage in different 
parts of the country. 
An example of incomplete political unrest and transi-
tion into a revolution is what happened on August 24, 
2012, where 17 movement, coalition and political force 
called for demonstrate against President Mohamed Mursi 
and his party, those forces wanted to turn these events 
into a second revolution against the regime, but when the 
conditions for a Revolution were not available, the event 
remained at an isolated demonstration, despite all the 
media and political momentum given. 
3.2. Interpretation of the Length of the 
Transitional Period of the Egyptian 
Revolution 
Although the actual duration of the revolution on the 
regime in Egypt lasted from the twenty-fifth of January 
2011 until the evening of 11th February 2011, the revo-
lution was not completed until the election of the Peo-
ple’s Assembly and the consultative Council, then the 
election of President of the Republic in the twenty-fourth 
of June 2012. In addition to the aforementioned factors 
the length of the period after the departure of former Pre- 
sident until the election of President Mohamed Mursi— 
the so-called transition period—can be attributed to sev-
eral factors, including:  
1) The presence of hope for some of the beneficiaries 
from the former regime to crush the revolution and return 
to the previous status, those people were called “the re-
mainders or the counter-revolution”. They have tried to 
terminate the revolution many times, but the awareness 
of the educated people in addition to increased political 
awareness of the public foiled those attempts, including 
the events of MASPERO, Mohamed Mahmoud and the 
syntax complex. 
2) Blurred vision of many citizens and political forces 
which led to confused practices and acts. Once demon-
strating in favor of the military council, and once against 
them, also once demonstrating in favor of the Muslim 
Brotherhood for their support to the revolution and once 
demonstrating against them for reasons that differ from 
time to time, accusing them Sometimes of exploiting and 
stealing the revolution, other times of concluding a deal 
whit the military council and again breaking their prom-
ises to the people. 
3) Some external forces tried some political maneuvers 
in Egypt at times of political and security chaos. 
4) The insistence of many sides to play a political role 
contrary to their role and responsibilities like the Su-
preme Constitutional Court, which had a big role in 
bringing many political problems in Egypt. 
5) Weak political and economic performance by the 
military council during their administration of the coun-
try whether intentionally or due to the lack of necessary 
experience3. 
3.3. Merits of the Egyptian Revolution 
In addition to ending an era degradation and backward-
ness to the Egyptian state on all internal and external 
respects, the Egyptian revolution generated a new spirit 
that led the young generation not to think about migra-
tion abroad, and to contribute to the retrieval of the 
money stolen and smuggled abroad which is estimated at 
about 10% of GDP, the revolution also deepened the 
sense of pride and the sense of social responsibility that 
has grown in all segments of society, particularly honest 
businessmen. There is no doubt that this will have a sig-
nificant impact on driving the growth and economic and 
social development in Egypt in the short and long term, 
also in the reduction of widespread corruption in the 
Egyptian society, and will provide a good structure for 
public, private and foreign investment. 
3.4. Interpretation of the Arab Spring 
Revolutions: The Need for a New Theory 
Analyzing the applicability of current theories that ex-
plain the political unrest on the Arab Spring revolutions 
and specifically on the Egyptian revolution, it is clear 
that the Arab Spring revolutions have special attributes, 
reasons as well as results. For example, in terms of the 
likelihood of political unrest in Egypt, estimates of the 
GDP per capita in Egypt indicate that, according to stud-
ies, the possibility of political unrest is less than 4%. In 
terms of reasons for the outbreak of political unrest, the 
reasons behind the Arab Spring revolutions are different 
from the reasons of political unrest outbreak. The reasons 
in the case of the Arab Spring are accompanied by social 
and political reason at the same importance of economic 
reasons. the economic reasons in Egypt are manifested in 
the fact that about 40% of Egyptians live on $2 per day, 
and then the mine challenge for Egypt is to create job for 
the unemployed on the one hand and achieve justice in 
the distribution of income and wealth on the other, where 
the unemployment rate reached 9% in 2010, and the 
unemployment rate among the graduates and postgradu-
ate 20.1% in 2011. The poverty rate in Egypt has evolved 
from 17.2 to 24.3 then to 21.6 through the period of 
1981/1982-2008, and GINI coefficient fluctuated through 
the same period (Table 1). In the year 2010, the average 
wage for a public sector worker was 542 and 299 pounds 
a week for a public and private sectors respectively [24]. 
Vertical inequality does not affect the presence or ab-
sence of political unrest, because measuring vertical 
equality does not tell anything about the rich and the  
3The events of Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud, the council of Ministers 
and the burning of the science complex are clear examples of this. 
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Table 1. Some indicators of poverty in Egypt. 
Year Poverty rate GINI 
1981/1982 17.2 NA 
1990/1991 24.3 32.00 
1995/1996 19.4 30.13 
1999/2000 16.7 NA 
2004/2005 19.6 NA 
2008 21.6 36.1 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, 2011. 
 
poor, but horizontal inequality is the inequality distribu-
tion of income among different regions, ethnic groups 
and political and religious groups which represent a 
cause for political unrest especially if there was dis-
crimination in favor of the groups represented in the 
power, the absence of equality in the distribution of in-
come, especially horizontal equality, leads to dissatisfac-
tion and the beginnings of the protest [25]. With respect 
to education in Egypt, enrollment rates in pre-primary 
education has reached 23% and 24% among female and 
male students for the year 2010/2011, in secondary edu-
cation those rates reached 29% and 24% for female and 
male students respectively in the same year, the ratio 
between the number of students per teacher reached 27.1, 
19.3 and 12.2 in the primary, preparatory and secondary 
stages respectively for the year 2010/2011 for public 
education, while in the private education, the percentages 
stands at 18.9, 12.3 and 13.1 in the primary, preparatory 
and secondary stages respectively, in the mentioned year, 
illiteracy rate among male reached 22.3% and females 
37.3% in 2006 while the drop-out rate in primary educa-
tion reached 2.37% in 2006. The public spending on 
education represents 11.72% of the total public expendi-
ture in the year 2010/2011 [26]. The social and political 
reasons are represented in the prevalence of corruption, 
nepotism and the lack of/delayed justice, inequality in 
rights and duties, low safety factor at home, weak sense 
of belonging and citizenship, sense of alienation at home, 
prevalence of the police state, sense of persecution, loss 
of rights and finally suppression of freedom4. Also the 
former regime was characterized by some of the Oligar-
chy system characteristics where a group of corrupt 
businessmen controlled various sectors of the economy 
and monopolized many of these sectors, and practiced all 
types of financial, economic and political corruption, 
such groups received all types of support from the former 
regime due to the convergence of interests, and where the 
presence and continuation of these corrupt groups means 
the continuation of the corrupt regime. Under that regime, 
the majority of citizens felt alienated in their home with 
less feeling of home and homeland. 
On the other hand, the Arab spring revolutions differ 
from other political unrest on the side of the rebel groups 
formation .in the case of the Arab spring, the opposition 
(rebel) groups were formed over a long period of time, 
took many forms and were not moved by the first fac-
tor—looting seeking—but mostly evoked by the second 
factor—justice seeking—and also the rebel groups in the 
Arab spring were not armed. According to the prevailing 
economic theory in the economic literature, the feasibil-
ity factor is the most important for the continuation of the 
revolution, but this does not apply to the Arab spring 
revolutions, including the Egyptian revolution, where 
funding was not planned, and the revolution does not 
need financing because it was peaceful and does not need 
weapons nor equipment that requires financial re-
sources5. 
The decisive factor in the continuation of the Arab 
Spring revolutions is the violence perpetrated by the re-
gime against the demonstrators. The bloodshed and the 
fall of martyrs among the rebels acted like magic in fuel-
ing the courage, determination and perseverance in order 
to achieve the demands of the rebels on the one hand and 
also to avenge the martyrs on the other hand, this of 
course differs from other types of political unrest. 
There is another difference for the Arab Spring revolu-
tions, where communications through the Web and mo-
bile phones played an important role in the events of the 
Egyptian revolution. The rebels had called and organized 
the beginning of the demonstrations on the twenty-fifth 
of January using social networking as well as text mes-
sages on mobile phones, they continued using those 
means during the revolution in coordinating and arrang-
5It is worth mentioning that opposition groups are not formed together 
at the same time, but with the passage of time and the continuation of 
the miserable conditions, those groups may have their differences espe-
cially in the specific goals, but they mostly agree on the main objec-
tives which involve the need to change the reality to what is best for 
them. Finally, the formation of a group after another encourages others 
to venture and take the decision, and the credit will be largely attributed 
to the group that was formed first as they play a major role in breaking 
the fear factor, especially in communities where repressive actions 
against individuals are more. In Egypt, the KIFAYA (ENOUGH) 
movement was formed at the very beginning, which announced its 
rejection to the continuation of Mubarak in power raising their slogan 
KIFAYA, also rejecting the idea of inheriting the presidency by his son
The movement has demonstrated on many occasions, and it can be said 
that they have great credit in encouraging many citizens to follow their 
ideas either by forming a coalition or an association, or even go out to 
the street to express their views. 
4Under the emergency law in place since 1967, except for a break for 
18 months in the early eighties, police authority were expanded, con-
stitutional rights suspended, censorship imposed and the non-govern-
ment political activity was restricted. Also under the same law about 
seventeen thousand citizens were detained, and the number of political 
prisoners reached thirty thousand prisoners. Under this law, the Gov-
ernment has the right to detain any person for an indefinite period of 
time for a reason or for no apparent reason, people cannot defend 
themselves and the government can keep them in jail without trial. 
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ing demonstrations and even to identify and unify the 
demands of the rebels, as well as the exchange of exper-
tise and advice with others inside and outside Egypt6. 
As for the costs of the transition period, these are 
characterized as being high public costs paid by all indi-
viduals alike as a result of their faith in their revolution 
and the need to pay the price for the change, growth and 
Renaissance, in the sense that there is neither a winner 
nor a loser in this revolution. Also those costs, in part, 
indicate how fragile were the economic and social sys-
tems formed during the era of the former regime, as evi-
denced by the large disparity between the levels of cash 
wages and their real levels, which led to huge number of 
factional protests for various sectors of the economy 
during the transition period, of which, some is still on-
going till now. 
In sum, the Arab Spring revolutions have special fea-
tures that distinguish them from all other conflicts, and 
therefore it needs special theory to explain these revolu-
tions and set certain conditions for the eruption and con-
ditions for continuing to reap stage. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This study had tackled the concepts related to the Arab 
Spring and its economic causes, as well as its conse-
quences, and the possibility to be interpreted in the light 
of the economic framework adopted in prevailing eco-
nomic literature. The study adopted Egypt as a case study 
as the state where the Arab Spring had crystallized and 
achieved a considerable part of its soughed results. The 
study confirmed that the theories that explained the out-
break of conflicts in various forms had focused on the 
economic reasons, particularly the prevalence of poverty, 
inequality in income distribution and low levels of edu-
cation, but it was a different case in the Arab Spring 
revolutions, where the social and political reasons play 
the most important role in the outbreak of these revolu-
tions. Also, the Arab Spring revolutions have been 
formed and crystallized over time and it can be said that 
there were rehearsals for the Egyptian Revolution before 
the twenty-fifth of January on a number of occasions, but 
for the aforementioned reasons, those popular move-
ments have turned into a revolution that swept across the 
country. The violence against the rebels and the fall of 
Martyrs were decisive factors in the continuation of the 
Arab Spring revolutions. Finally the use of communica-
tion technology and social networking represent an im-
portant dimension that adds an urgent need to provide a 
new theory for the outbreak of political unrest and its 
ability to continue and even achieve goals with escalating 
demands when the period of such unrest is extended. In a 
more precise meaning, the economic literature needs a 
theory based on interpreting the active role of technology 
in the field of communication and social networking on 
the Arab Spring revolutions on the one hand, and show to 
what extent the impact of violence and fall of the martyrs 
and legitimate demands of rebels have on the continua-
tion of the revolution and rebels on the other hand. 
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